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Section I Introduction
Bankruptcies of big financial institutions such as Yamaichi Securities, Sanyo Securities and 
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank in the fall of 1997 triggered fears about the weakening financial strength of 
Japanese banks. The Japan premium in the Euro market increased from 0.047% in October to 0.375% 
on 20 November, and then rose further, peaking at 1.000% on 3 December. The ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) announced an emergency policy package to stabilize the Japanese financial 
system on 16 December 1997.
The present paper is an interim report by an academic who has been involved in this 
emergency package1. It covers the objectives of capital injection to 21 banks in March 1998, the 
failure of the Long-term Credit Bank (LTCB) in September 1998 and current policy efforts to reform 
Japanese banks to meet the so-called “Big Bang” challenge.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II gives various estimates on the amount of 
bad loans in 21 Japanese banks. Section III reviews the March 1998 emergency scheme to stabilize the 
Japanese banking system mainly through capital injection. Section IV explains the merger package to 
save LTCB and its background. Section V discusses the role of the mam bank at the time of 
bankruptcy, taking the case of LTCB and Nihon Leasing as an example. Section VI discusses the 
remaining issues in the Japanese banking reform.
Section II Japanese Banks’ Bad Loans
When Japanese growth rates declined for four consecutive years in the early 1990s, and a 
weak recovery in 1995/96 was aborted by an increase in the consumption tax (VAT) rate from 3% to 
5%, pessimistic sentiment among the public began to spread across Japan. The slowdown in the 
growth of consumer spending pushed Japan into a deep recession. Banks’ huge bad loans and the 
consequent credit crunch resulting from banks trying to recover their ailing balance sheets were other 
factors responsible for the slump. The lack of disclosure of banks on bad loans aroused suspicion in 
domestic as well as in foreign markets about the credibility of certain banks. In April 1998, major
I am grateful to Patricia Kmvayama, a senior scholar at Colombia Business School for carefully reading and commenting on 
the draft. I would also like to thank seminar participants at Program on U.S.-Japan Relations, Harvard University, Institute for 
International Economics (Washington, D.C.) and IC2 Institute, University o f Texas at Austin for their valuable comments and 
suggestions on earlier version o f this paper. Any remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the author. Financial support 
from Esso University Fund is greatly acknowledged. Revised, 30 November, 1998.
1 Emergency package called “The Emergency Measure to Stabilize the Financial System Law (EMSFS)” was terminated on 
21 October 1998.
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banks disclosed bad loans as of 31 March 1998 based on SEC standard followed in the US. See 
Table l2.
Table 1 shows surprising similarity among banks in terms of the amount of bad loans as well 
as the ratio of bad loans to total loans with only few exceptions. The differences between banks in the 
ratio of provision for bad loans, look larger than the differences in either of the amount or the ratio of 
bad loans. Except for Daiwa Bank, Nihon Credit Bank and Ashikaga Bank, all other 18 banks had 
provision for bad loans exceeding 50%.
From Table 1, one can see that major city banks, long-term and trust banks in Japan all face 
bad loan problems to a similar extent. Even LTCB, which fell into deep trouble three months later, 
does not look too different from the others in terms of the amount and the ratio of bad loans in the total 
or the provision for bad loans. This is one of the reasons why the Financial Crisis Management 
Committee (FCMC) repeatedly stressed the importance of sustaining the stability of the Japanese 
financial system rather than helping individual banks as the objective of capital injection in March.
Eighty trillion yen, or as much as 12% of GDP, is the most frequently quoted figure for the 
total of bad loans3 in the Japanese banks. Some banks, like the Fuji Bank, have disclosed their own 
assessment recently; but most of the banks do not disclose self-assessment figures. The Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) only discloses the total figure based on self-assessment reports from the banks.
The difference between the SEC based total and the self-assessment total, for all banks in 31 
March 1998 as shown in Figure 1, caused public suspicion that banks may be hiding bad loans. Part of 
the difference in the two figures is due to the difference in coverage and in the method of assessing 
bad loans. The self-assessment total includes not only loans but also securities, provisional payments, 
uncollected interest payments and others. In the SEC-based total, bad loans are grouped into: (a) failed 
institution (hatansaki saiken), (b) past due (yentai saiken), (c) restructured (kashidashi joken kanwa 
saiken), and (d) past due more than three months. In the self-assessment total, bad loans are grouped 
according to the degree of risk plus the amount secured with collateral or guarantee (see Appendix A 
for details).
It is true that the size of Japanese banks’ bad loans is large. And the deep recession in 1998 
will further increase loans, which need special caution -  for example class II loans in the self-
2 Although tables 1, 2, 5 and figure 1, 2 included in the present paper were prepared by the secretariat of the Financial Crisis 
Management Committee, the opinion expressed do not reflect those of the secretariat of the Committee or the Committee 
itself.
3 For example, The Economist (20 June 1998) titled “Japan’s Economic piight”(page 20) writes The bank's overhang o f  bad 
loans-estimated at SO trillion yen, or J 2% o f GDP s e rves as a brake on new lending and thus on demand.
3
assessment and past due risk management loans in the SEC categories.
Section III Capital Injection: 30 March 1998
As noted earlier, bankruptcies of large financial institutions in November 1997 prompted the 
ruling LDP to prepare EMSFS. The need for an emergency package came at the very time when two 
government bodies responsible for administering the financial system, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
and the Bank of Japan (BOJ) were under public attack for bribery and corrupt entertainment practices 
of their officials.
On 24 December 1997, the LDP set up a task force to prepare the emergency policy package 
for stabilizing the Japanese financial system. The bill, comprising emergency measures to stabilize the 
financial system, was submitted to the Diet on 19 January of the following year. The bill was passed 
on 16 February.
The bill involved a total rescue scheme of 30 trillion yen. Of this, 17 trillion yen was 
allocated to protect deposits in their full amount until March 2001. The purpose of the remaining 13 
trillion yen was to inject capital to the needed banks. The banks had to apply to receive such capital 
injection. Applications were reviewed and approved by the Financial Crisis Management Committee4.
Table 2 shows the approved amounts and conditions for the purchasing of preferred stocks 
and perpetual bonds of the 21 banks in March. Since the purpose of the capital injection was to 
stabilize the Japanese financial system, the committee emphasized the importance of raising the capital 
ratios of the respective banks. The committee also thought it was important to apply “market rates” as 
terms for the injection to assure the public money was being used efficiently. The terms and conditions 
were based on the advice of private consultant firms including some foreign firms.
The response of the public and the press to the capital injection was generally unfavorable. A 
typical response was "Why do we have to save banks and not others”, “Injecting similar amount of 
money to the 21 major banks is the same old convoy system”. “Criteria for the capital injection are not 
clear” and etc. However, everybody on the committee (including the secretariat who actually worked 
through Christmas and New Year’s to speed up the result) was relieved to see the decline in the Japan
4 Committee member consists of four members from the government (Governor of Bank o f Japan, Minister of Finance, 
Commissioner of Financial Supervisory Agency, and President of Deposit Insurance Corporation) and three members from 
the private sector (at the time of capital injection, Chairman of Japan Federation of Economic Organizations, President of 
Japan Federation of Bar Associations and myself). Each member had one vote for important agenda, and any decision
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premium after the injection as shown in Figure 1.
Although stock prices of major banks fell more than the average stock price of companies in 
other fields, the Japan premium remained rather stable until mid-June when the stock of LTCB started 
to face strong selling pressure.
Section IV LTCB Problem (Chogin-Mondai)
IV-1 LTCB-STB Merger Scheme
The average stock price of banks in the Tokyo Stock Exchange declined from 494 yen on 5 
March5, to 382 yen on 16 June. The average 22.6% decline was much greater than the fall of the 
average Nikkei stock price of 12.6% during this period. The price of LTCB’s stock fell most 
drastically from 345 yen to 153 yen (-54.9%). Besides LTCB, other banks also faced a sharp fall in 
their stock prices; Yasuda Trust (-46.5%), Fuji Bank (-46.4%), Sumitomo Trust (-36.1%) and Daiwa 
Bank (-35.6%).
LTCB’s stock continued to fall to 58 yen on 25 June. On 26 June, LTCB and Sumitomo 
Trust Bank (STB) announced a merger scheme. The Minister of Finance also published a statement 
saying that “Today we received a report that STB and LTCB will start to plan their merger. After 22 
June, the Financial Supervisory Agency will assume auditing and supervisory responsibilities of 
individual banks but MOF highly favors the present merger p lan ....................... ”
In spite of the announcement of an intent to merge with STB and the Minister of Finance’s 
endorsement, LTCB’s stock continued to fall. When S&P downgraded LTCB from BBB to BB+ on 31 
July, it fell to 50 yen. When Moody’s changed LTCB’s rating from Baa 3 to Ba 1, its stock hit a low of 
38 yen. People started to wonder what was happening to the merger scheme.
The announcement of the LTCB-STB merger on 21 August was unusual in three respects. (1) 
The plan and conditions for the merger were announced by the presidents of the two banks, supported 
by speeches of Prime Minister Obuchi, Minister of Finance Miyazawa, Governor Hay ami of BOJ and 
Mr. Hino of the Financial Supervisory Agency. (2) LTCB’s financial improvement plan included 
writing off LTCB’s loans to three closely related non-banks: Nihon Leasing, Nihon Randix Buildings 
and NED Corp. (3) The application for public fluids by capital injection was mentioned by LTCB.
required an animus approval from the members.
5 The application for capital injection by 2! major banks was made on 5 March.
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In their respective speeches, Miyazawa, Hayaini and Hino pointed out that LTCB would 
apply for capital injection if it became temporarily undercapitalized by writing off loans. The President 
of STB announced three preconditions for the merger: 1) STB would accept only sound assets from 
LTCB, 2) LTCB would be responsible for restructuring its related and closely related companies, and 
3) STB would carry out its own auditing of LTCB’s assets.
LTCB’s restructuring scheme announced by President Olinogi included the following: 1) the 
forgiving LTCB’s loan to Nihon Leasing (250 billion yen), Nihon Randix (110 billion yen) and NED 
(160 billion yen) in order to help them write off their bad loans and restructure their business, 2) the 
provision for bad loans of about 230 billion yen would be carried out depending on the outcome of 
BOJ’s audit in May and a similar inspection by the Financial Supervisory Agency, 3) if capital 
adequacy ratio would fall as a result of land 2, LTCB planed to apply for capital injection, 4) the 
President, vice-president, chairman and other high banking management were to resign, 5) wage cuts 
for management and employees, including reduction in number of workers and withdrawal from 
foreign operations to be carried out, 6) other rationalization plans were to include the sale of LTCB’s 
main office and other real estate, owned by LTCB.
1V-2 Downfall of LTCB
LTCB was established in 1952, by taking over the bond issue section of Nihon Kangyo Bank 
and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank. LTCB like the other two long-term banks, the Industrial Bank of 
Japan and the Nippon Credit Bank was allowed to issue bank debenture. LTCB was not permitted to 
take deposits except from its borrowers, mainly firms. LTCB’s role was to provide stable long-term 
loans to Japanese industries. LTCB was established to fulfill the industrial policy needs of the 1950s 
and 1960s. As liberalization of the Japanese financial system proceeded after 1984, the long-term 
credit banks started to face more competition from city banks, security companies and non-financial 
companies6. Globalization of financial markets affected not only the Japanese financial sector but also 
manufacturing sector. Japanese manufacturing firms started to use then* financial subsidiaries for profit 
purposes. They engaged in financial profit making activities at home and abroad termed Zaiteku7. The 
US-Japan bilateral trade imbalance did not change much even after the G-5 agreement in 1985. 
Expansionary fiscal policy and easy money policy were adopted in Japan to achieve domestic demand-
6 Somel (1992) gives excellent summaries of competition between different types o f financial institutions after 1984 
liberalization in Japan each trying to protect their vested interest in the domestic market.
7 Zaiteku means finance technology in Japanese. Sazanami (1992) found subsidiary finance companies set up by Japanese 
manufacturing firms in Europe increasingly played important roles in raising funds more efficiently thus reducing the cost of 
capital. Such development continued in the 1990s. S & P ranking of top financial institutions rank Toyota Motor Credit Corp 
as AAA in 2 Marchl998. Japanese financial institutions exceeding this ranking were Export-Import Bank of Japan and Japan
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led growth. When prices of land and other real estates responded to the expansionary policy, Japanese 
banks took land as excellent collateral and expanded lending which pushed the price still further. Rise 
in stock prices enabled Japanese banks to use low-cost equity financing to invest in real estate at home 
and abroad.
When expectations for the further rise in stock prices and real estate ended between 1989 and 
1990, asset prices started to decline. Japanese banks were hit by the decline more severely than 
manufacturing firms because they were counting 45% of unrealized gains on their own stock holdings 
as Tier II capital under BIS rules. They also found themselves carrying piles of over-valued real estate 
taken as collateral. After the bubble bust, the value of collateral declined sharply and the banks 
subsequently had to write off their loans at loss.
LTCB, as hi the case of other credit banks, depends on bank debentures as a source of funds. 
Since its primary role was to supply long-term loans to the corporate sector, LTCB faced difficulty 
when large firms started to raise funds directly from the capital market, LTCB changed its strategy to 
establish closely related non-banks to get into newly emerging service fields such as leasing (Nihon 
Leasing), or assisting venture business (NED). LTCB’s trouble started when these non-banks started to 
get into the real estate business. Among the top ten big borrowers from LTCB as of eud-March 1998, 
four are non-banks financing real estate and construction. In other words, LTCB was one of the banks 
most severely hit by the post-bubble real estate related bad loans.
Section V Failure of LTCB Rescue Package and the Nihon Leasing
V -l LTCB and the Party Politics
The importance of bank credit in supplying funds to the private sector is much greater in 
Japan than in other industrialized countries. According to BIS Annual Report (1998), bank credit to 
the private sector as a percent o f GDP in 1997 was 111% in Japan. Similar ratios were 65% in the US 
and 89% in G-10 European countries8. Japan’s banking reform will affect not only the relationship 
between banks and corporate firms but also that between urban and rural areas. The regional 
distribution of income is a very important political issue in Japan.
When the LDP lost its majority in the Upper House in the July election, the LTCB case was 
targeted as the symbol of LDP’s discretionary fiscal policy by opposition parties led by Mr. Kan o f the
Development Bank. Both are government banks.
s Table VII Upage 119) finds relatively high ratio for East Asian countries, 157% in Hong Kong, 138% in Taiwan, 105% in
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Democratic Party (Minshu-To). The party’s claim that “the LDP is trying to rescue LTCB for political 
interest” had public appeal. LTCB’s case was also linked to Mr. Kan and his followers’ political fight 
to dismantle MOF’s power by separating its administrative jurisdiction in government finance from 
monetary policy. This issue also had a general political appeal. The Financial Supervisory Agency was 
set up to answer such claims but the Democratic Party wanted to push reform.
Debates in the Lower House over passing the law called “Financial Revitalization Related 
Law” (Kinyu Saisei Kanren Hoan) which started in August were mixed up with party politics, 
ministerial interests, generational opinion differences of LDP members and other conflicts.
The deadline to reach some compromises between the LDP and the opposition parties was 
Prime Minister Obuchi’s visit to the U.S. scheduled for 21 September. However, the political turmoil 
did not end. The LDP and the opposition parties still had to negotiate another ten days before they 
agreed on three interrelated issues: (a) the future of LTCB, (b) MOF and its jurisdiction and (c) a 
scheme for reforming banks after their failure9.
Capital injection to 21 banks in March 1998 based on EMSFS was under severe attack from 
the opposition parties for two reasons. Firstly, criteria for capital injection to LTCB by purchasing its 
preferred stocks (1,300 million yen) and perpetual loans (466 million yen) was said to be too lenient. 
Secondly, capital injection before the failure of the bank should not be made. The opposition parties 
wanted strict rules for capital injection and to have a new scheme for financial revitalization.
When Prime Minister Obuchi promised Mr. Kan that EMSFS would be repealed as part of 
his package of compromises to enact the new Financial Revitalization Related Law (FRRL), LTCB’s 
rescue package which included pre-merger capital injection collapsed. The collapse unveiled intricate 
borrower-lender relationships between banks, non-banks, insurance companies, agricultural credit 
associations and rural mutual trust associations in Japan,
V-2 LTCB’s role as a main bank in “botai-ko” system
LTCB-STB merger package (21 August) included the forgiving of loans to Nihon Leasing 
(250 billion yen) and to two other non-banks. Nihon Leasing is not one of the LTCB’s 26 affiliates. 
Since banks are not allowed to hold more than 5% of company shares by Japanese Antimonopoly Act 
(Article 11), LTCB only holds 4.84% of Nihon Leasing’s total shares. It is in fact topped by Ricoh’s
Thailand, 97% in China and Singapore, and 95% in Malaysia.
9 Summary' outcome is shown in Appendix B.
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holding which is 5.44%. LTCB has close relationship with Nihon Leasing through providing loans 
(13.4% of Nihon Leasing’s total loan at end-March 1998) and by sending LTCB’s former director, Mr. 
Okamoto as the president. LTCB was planning to play the role of “botai-ko”. Botai-ko’s responsibility 
is much greater than that of conventional main bank. For example, LTCB was going to forgive 250 
billion yen, almost equal to its credit to Nihon Leasing outstanding at end-March (255 billion yen). 
Nihon Leasing was asking other financial institutions to write off only part of their loans10.
As party politics continued to dominate the Diet, the creditors of LTCB and Nihon Leasing 
started to doubt the possibility of LTCB’s 21 August merger plan being realized. It was clear that the 
withdrawal of deposits and redemption of bank debentures from LTCB were weakening its financial 
capability to assume the role of “botai-ko”. President Ohnogi repeatedly stressed that by forgiving its 
loan to the non-banks including Nihon Leasing and applying for capital injection, LTCB was ensuring 
total cost for the Japanese economy as a whole would be less than otherwise11. However, criticism 
over the use of public money to save LTCB seemed to be winning the public support.
On 19 September, Yasuda-Tnist Bank (YTB) took legal action by sending letters to Nihon 
Leasing’s customers instructing them to pay leasing fees directly to YTB. The Japan Mutual Aid 
Agricultural Cooperative Association (Zenkoku Kyosai Nogyo Kurniai Rengokai) took similar action 
on 24 September. Faced with such moves by creditors, Nihon Leasing asked the Tokyo Local Court 
for protection under the Corporate Rehabilitation Law (Kaisha Kosei Ho) on 27 September. The 
failure of Nihon Leasing with total debt estimated at 2.81 trillion yen was the largest bankruptcy in 
postwar Japan. The bankruptcy of Nihon Leasing may cause difficulties among small regional banks 
and its client firms. According to President Ohnogi’s testimony in the Lower House, more than 160 
financial institutions provided loans to Nihon Leasing. Table 3 shows that 53% of the total 1912.6 
billion yen loans to Nihon Leasing at end-March were provided by the top 10 creditors. If we divide 
the remaining loans by 150 (subtracting top 10 from the total 160) the average loan per creditor comes 
out to be 6.7 billion yen. Such amount, if not collected, can impose heavy burden on small financial 
institutions.
10 According to President Okanioto’s (Nihon Leasing) testimony at the Lower House on 31 August 1998.
11 President Ohnogi’s (LTCB) testimony at the Lower House on August 31 and at the Upper House on 10 September.
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Section VI Key Issues in Japanese Banking Reform
VI-1 Nihon Leasing’s Bankruptcy and Small Regional Lenders
When it became clear that LTCB would be temporarily nationalized12 under the new 
Financial Revitalization Law, Nihon Leasing’s initial rehabilitation plan which followed “botai-ko” 
system similar to the Jusen 1996 rescue scheme collapsed.
When seven companies specializing in housing finance (Jutaku Senmon Kaisha) were 
dissolved in 1996, their “botai-ko” and other banks wrote off 3.5 trillion yen and 0.68 trillion yen 
respectively. Total credit outstanding for banks was 7.3 trillion yen. Agricultural financial institutions 
donated 0.53 trillion yen to cover their 5.5 trillion yen credit outstanding. The government supplied 
0.68 trillion yen.
Total cost for other creditors of Nihon Leasing would have been smaller if LTCB forgave 
credit to Nihon Leasing rather than letting it going bankrupt. In particular, the small regional member 
financial institutions of mutual aid associations, along with agricultural cooperatives and credit 
associations, now have to bear the burden. In the initial Nihon Leasing rehabilitation plan, these small 
financial institutions were exempted from forgiving the loan13.
These small financial institutions are also facing the difficulties in regional finance and 
pressed for management reform. For example, the Japan Credit Association (Zenkoku Shinyo Kumiai 
Rengokai) recently decided to ask the Deposit Insurance Corporation to help failed members14. Except 
for two cases, the Toyo Credit Association in 1992 and Kamaishi Credit Association in 1993 (failing 
credit associations relied on their own mutual assistance funds (Sogo Enjyo Shikin) when members 
went bankrupt.) The recent change in their rescue policy toward using the Deposit Insurance Scheme 
would accelerate the restructuring of weak credit association members.
VI-2 Agricultural Financial Institutions and Administrative Reform
The new FRRL followed EMSFS in administering labor union related financial institutions 
and agriculture and fishery related financial institutions. MOF must determine issues related to the 
former jointly with the Ministry of Labor and the latter jointly with the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fishery.
12 On 8 October, STB’s President Takahashi in his press conference announced that the committee discussing LTCB-STB 
merger scheme would be terminated.
13 Nihon Keizai Shimbun(moming edition, 29 September 1998)
14 Nihon Keizai Shimbun(morning edition, 19 September 1998)
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Political freighting between LDP and opposition parties on the issue of separating MOF’s 
power on budget policy (Zaisei) and fiscal policy (Kinyu) became mixed up with the issue about the 
administrative jurisdiction of agricultural financial institutions. The opposition party’s financial 
revitalization law originally planned to make the Financial Revitalization Commission the sole agent 
responsible for administering financial institutions. However in the new FRRL, the financial troubles 
of agricultural financial institutions will continue to be under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries - a choice that was probably backed by LDP’s political interests. This will 
continue until year 2003 when administrative reform of ministries is expected.
VI-3 Affiliates, Related Companies and Corporate Groups
LTCB has six affiliates in Japan and twenty affiliates abroad in which it owns majority share 
holdings. Their accounts are to be settled jointly with LTCB’s. But three companies are not affiliates 
including Nihon Leasing whose loans LTCB planned to forgive in the merger plan with STB. These 
are related companies controlled by management of LTCB, which provided loans and directors. LTCB 
was criticized at the questioning in the Lower House for shifting its bad loans to related companies 
and hiding the acUial loss15.
From end-March 1999, the Financial Supervisory Agency will enforce the requirement that 
banks must disclose bad loans of related companies including non-banks in which they have less than 
5% shareholdings. The new rule called “actual control criteria” included 1) related companies with 
share holding exceeding 4% inclusive of indirect holdings, 2) related companies whose directors sent 
from the banks and 3) related companies for whose losses the bank actually is expected to assume 
responsibility.
The Japanese Corporate Accounting Council (Kigyo Kaikei Shingikai) is planning to require 
the disclosure of corporate accounts including affiliates from end-March 2000 and for bad loans of 
banks from end-March 1999. But enforcement of these new criteria will increase the stated amount of 
bad loans of Japanese banks and the amount necessary that banks have to allow for such bad loans.
The failure of the LTCB rescue package and the subsequent bankruptcy of its related 
company, Nihon Leasing illustrates the importance of banks in the Japanese economy16. Companies 
and banks are tied not only through cross-share hold mgs but also through main-bank-borrower
15 See President Ohnogi’s testimony of the Lower House on 31 August answering a question by diet member Kijima.
16 Japan has many financial institutions, including 176 banks, 401 credit associations (Shinyo Kinko) as members of Deposit 
Insurance Corporation in 1997. The total membership of 976 in 1997, looks large, but it was 1,007 in 1995.
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relationships. Other financial institutions, frequently small ones, follow the leader, namely main banks 
trusting their credibility and judgement. The top ten lenders to Nihon Leasing in Table 3 are all large 
well-known banks and insurance companies in Japan. More than 160 financial institutions including 
small regional mutual aid association, agricultural cooperative and credit associations were also 
lending to Nihon Leasing at the time of its bankruptcy.
According to the latest survey by the Fair Trade Commission covering Japanese corporations 
belonging to six major corporate groups (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Sanwa, Daiichi 
Kangin), total loans (short-term plus long-term) still accounted for 56.7% of corporate fluids raised in 
1996. The rest was raised by issuing corporate bonds, 32.8% and commercial paper, 10.5%. The 
importance of loans from financial institutions belonging to the same group is rising since 1989 as 
seen in Table 417.
VI-4 Capital Injection, Capital Ratio and the Credit Crunch (Kashi shiburi)
Deposit Insurance Corporation was established in 1971 to protect depositors of failed banks 
and to provide financial assistance at member’s resolution. The first case of actual assistance came 
into effect 21 years later, in 199218.
The failure of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and the LTCB problems raised two additional 
problems not covered by EMSFS. The first question is “What happens if a failed bank cannot find a 
rescuing financial institution?” Secondly, “If a failed bank is too large to have the assets taken over by 
a rescuing financial institution, what will happen to the borrowers?” The FRRL of 12 October19 aims 
to answer these two questions. The FRRL is based primarily on the opposition party’s scheme - to 
weaken the influence of MOF’s discretionary policy. So, it empowered the Financial Revitalization 
Commission by appointing a cabinet minister to be the chairman and by enacting strict rules in writing 
off bad loans and in purchasing stocks from ailing banks. But the new act does not cover the 13 trillion 
yen capital injection scheme, which will be abolished after the enactment of the FRRL.
When FRRL passed the Lower House in 2 October, the stock market the following Monday 
responded to the fear that banks would contract their loans now that they cannot rely on capital 
injection to clear the 8% capital ratio standard. On 5 October, Monday, the Nikkei average fell to
17 Total of loan by member banks, life-insurance corporations and property insurance corporation. Surveys do not give further 
details on loans to corporations within the group. For example, the amount o f loan by different types of financial institutions 
is not disclosed.
18 Toho Sogo Ginko failed in 1991 and Deposit Insurance provided 8 billion yen loan to Iyo Bank for the rescue scheme in 
1992.
19 See Appendix B.
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12,948 yen, the lowest level since 30 Jannary 1986.
Pushed by domestic pressure voiced mainly from the industrial lobbies who stressed the need 
for capital injection to avoid a credit crunch and external pressure from the G-7 asking for the swift 
recovery of the Japanese economy, the LDP started to prepare another bill which will enable capital 
injection even to sound banks. At this point, there was no objection from opposition parties. It was 
strange to find the Democratic Party (so strongly opposed to capital injection to the LTCB before 
merging to the STB) proposing a 50 trillion yen capital injection scheme!!
The new capital injection scheme was enacted as Financial Function Early Strengthening 
Law (Kinyu Kino Soki Kenzenka no taineno Kinkyusochi Ho). Major changes in the new injection 
scheme compared to EMSFS are: 1) the Financial Revitalization Commission led by the cabinet 
minister and four full-time members who will assist him with the capital injection, 2) ordinary stocks 
can be purchased, 3) the prompt-corrective-act ion provision of the Financial Supervisory Agency will 
be applied to undercapitalized banks, and 4) for banks with capital adequacy ratio above 8%, capital 
injection can be made provided that injection will help to avoid a “financial crisis” and an “adverse 
impact on the regional economy and employment”. As in the former scheme, the application of the act 
will continue until end-March 2001. The government will provide a guarantee up to 25 trillion yen for 
the scheme20.
In the new capital injection scheme, the capital ratio of each bank will become a very 
important criteria for the injection. Evaluation of Japanese banks’ capital ratios needs careful 
assessment. The LTCB problem is a good example, raising the question of whether the ratio can be 
used as the standard for sound banks.
As noted earlier, Japanese financial institutions hold more than half (56% in 1996) of 
Japanese shares in unit number terms. Changes in the price of stocks affect the capital ratio of banks, 
because 45% of unrealized gain in shares are allowed to be added to Tier II capital. From 31 March 
1998, Japanese banks were allowed to apply acquired cost or market price of shares in calculating 
their capital ratios. Banks which had unrealized losses naturally chose to use acquisition cost. But the 
problem remains. Namely, they now have unrealized losses which do not appear in the capital ratio.
At end-1997, claims of Japanese banks in Asia accounted for almost 70% of the total 
international claims, excluding those against offshore banking centers21. Many countries in Asia peg 
their exchange rate to the dollar. Foreign assets valued in dollar increase when the yen falls against the
20 See Appendix C.
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dollar thus decreasing the capital ratio of Japanese banks. The worst scenario for the capital ratio of 
Japanese banks at home is always a fall in simultaneous share prices and the exchange rate of the yen.
At end-March 1998, LTCB had the highest capital ratio among city and long-term banks 
applying for capital injection (see Table 5). LTCB’s trouble started only three months after the 
injection. One of the reasons may be the treatment of closely related companies. Although settlement 
of the affiliates will be included in the parent bank’s capital ratio, closely related companies like Nihou 
Leasing do not link their profits and losses to LTCB’s account. The financial Supervisory Agency is 
reported to be starting to audit these closely related companies from end-March 1999. However, the 
definition and criteria of related companies are not clear yet.
Table 5 shows that all 21 banks decreased their risky assets in 31 March 1998 by more than 
their initial estimates. In spite of the capital injection at end-March, the fall in yen and stock prices, 
increase in allowance for loans to Asian countries, and the sharp business downturn at home evidently 
prompted Japanese banks to reduce their risky assets. Banks may respond to the strict enforcement of 
the capital ratio standards in the new capital injection scheme by not applying for the injection but 
reducing the risky assets. On the other hand, capital injection without strict rules would perpetuate 
moral hazard, which will retard Japanese banking reform.
21 BIS “Consolidated Banking Statistics May 1998”.
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Appendix C
Financial Function Early Strengthening Law (FFESL)
1 The FFESL passed the Diet on 16 October, 1998. The purpose of FFESL is to restructure Japanese 
banks by accelerating the swift disposal of bad loans and promoting recapitalization.
2 When applications are fielded by undercapitalized banks, the Resolution and Collection 
Organization (RCO) can purchase their common stocks. The banks are required to submit to the 
Financial Revitalization Commission (FRC) their plans for restructuring to restore the soundness 
of management. The applications have to be approved by the FRC before the purchase of common 
stocks.
3 The RCO can purchase preferred stocks and/or subordinated bonds and loans upon applications 
received from the banks. The FRC must approve the applications. The approvals are based on, (a) 
whether banks can implement strict restructuring according to measures required in respective 
capital ratio categories, (b) as for banks with 8% and above capital ratio category, rescue financial 
institutions of failed banks can apply. Also, when raising the capital ratio of respective banks is 
essential to avoid substantial credit crunch and/or adverse impacts on regional employment, they 
can apply.
4 25 trillion yen ceiling of government guarantees is established as Financial Function Early 
Strengthening Account to implement above measures.
5 FFESL covers period till end-March 2001.
(Source) Author’s summary based on LDP’s “Kiuyu System Soki Kenzenka Taisaku no Gaiyo”
6 October, 1998.
16
